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Joined 3 years ago
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Cake day: June 11th, 2023

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  • It is my impression that deep strike drones previously flew pre-programmed (attempting to locate the target using satnav, with some fancy versions using ground scanning lidar or machine vision).

    The problem of deep strike drones becoming remote-controlled seems recent, and Ukraine has been experiencing an increasing frequency of those since autumn. They’ve been attacking moving targets. One recently hit a locomotive moving on a railway, the other hit a bus full of miners.

    I don’t know the background - was Starlink responsive or unresponsive, or did Ukrainians wait for a statistical curve of adoption to present itself and become certain, before asking Starlink to pull the rug.

    What is clear that Ukraine has worked out a way of registering and whitelisting their own Starlink terminals, and hasn’t yet fully completed the process. Some Ukrainian units relying on small donors’ Starlink dishes are still working to get theirs whitelisted. However, this likely can’t be used to determine if Starlink was responsive to requests, as Ukraine would likely not start implementing a whitelist before getting a positive reply from Starlink - so the process becomes rushed for natural reasons.

    Russians have been observed cursing Musk in colorful ways. In several places, offensive operations have temporarily stopped because units had become over-reliant on Starlink, and considered Musk “their own guy”.

    Next step: war of the mesh networks.

    Serhii Beskrestnov (radio amateur and now adviser to the Ukrainian defense ministry) has already pointed out that Russian drones are increasingly often providing connectivity to those that fly before them (expensive Chinese frequency hopping mesh radios have been recovered). While this dulls the edge of the swarm (the swarm has to be gradual, air defense will get time to reload) it requires Ukrainians to rework their jamming efforts and try to shoot down the relay nodes (which may be identifiable using signals intelligence). And of course, ideally, someone should talk to the Chinese companies, maybe offering to buy all the fancy mesh radios they make.


  • Besides the speculations about Israel and Russia having some relation to Epstein’s “work” (which sure looks like a honeypot, even if typically the operator of a honeypot doesn’t dive into honey) there is another avenue of extortion open currently.

    It is imaginable that US special services could offer people “deals” worded like:

    • “would you like your name to be redacted from, or published with the Epstein files?”

    …and it’s foreseeable that some people would do a lot to have their name redacted. I hope that in the DoJ, it’s a large crew of many people doing the redactions, since that would reduce risk of someone trading favours.




  • Jammers, jammers and ever more jammers.

    If Starlink cooperates, that’s good because Ukrainian units use it for their stationary communications.

    But one also has to jam GPS, Galileo, Glonass and Beidou - and these systems cannot cooperate, they just have to be jammed.

    Drones can navigate using mobile networks: mobile operators have to prevent data traffic to a SIM card which roams too fast between base stations. Drones may read mobile network cell IDs, this has to be prevented.

    …and finally, drones can communicate directly with ground stations far away. This too must be jammed.

    …and then, drones can navigate using machine vision, radio direction finding or ground-sensing radar / lidar. These methods are really hard to counter, if they start using that, then it’s kinetic defense only. :o


  • Sadly, the “student” (Russia) has by far exceeded the teacher (Iran) by now, and only depends on China to supply components.

    To prevent damage, one has to either:

    • prevent their navigation (success varies by week)
    • reduce Russian revenue (moderately successful, there is economic trouble in Russia)
    • negotiate with China to stop the supply of parts (so far, no success)
    • strike at assembly factories (increasingly hard, as drones can be made anywhere and factories are far)
    • strike at logistics (doable, but needs a steady stream of high quality intelligence)

    Of these avenues, I think Ukraine has been most successful at preventing navigation and reducing Russia’s revenue stream by just droning them back.


  • Inara has a very good point.

    You already have other skills. You likely have other resources. What is your job in all of this? What are you capable of doing? /…/ You know what is needed in crisis? Lots of people doing the work that they’re able to do.

    It is very likely that most people can accomplish a lot more peacefully. :)

    However, I would like to offer opposition on another point:

    Could it potentially become more dangerous to have it than to not have it?

    In the time of remote operated weapons stations, not really if used with caution.



  • When local media released security camera footage of the couple fighting on a dark street outside it – Şebnem in a summer dress, squaring her shoulders at Bayhan – Sığın’s suspicions grew. She spoke with waiters in a nearby fish restaurant, who recalled the pair angrily leaving what was meant to be a romantic dinner there.

    /…/

    Sığın also got access to the police records, including a video they took inside the hotel room the morning after Şebnem’s death. This appears to show evidence of a clash: large spots of blood on the floor and a torn dark green-painted fingernail tangled in the bedsheet.

    Summary: Turkish police investigate so superficially that it would permit men to push women out of windows without getting charged.

    The prosecutor assigned to the case told İbrahim he was so confident Aysun had jumped 17 metres (56 feet) from her office window to her death that they would release her body for burial only if he signed a document attesting she had taken her own life. Hüsniye begged her husband not to sign and eventually a workaround was found. “The prosecutor wouldn’t say why he thought it was a suicide,” İbrahim says. “He was supposed to go to the scene, but he didn’t.”

    Summary: Turkish prosecutors sometimes refuse to review evidence and pressure people to sign statements which ease their work.