Please listen to this podcast about ANOM:
https://darknetdiaries.com/transcript/146/
The FBI ran a sting operation in Europe where they created their own ‘secure’ phone and messaging platform. Their OS used portions of our code and was heavily marketed as being GrapheneOS or based on GrapheneOS.
Through this operation, the FBI provided criminals in Europe with a communication network they heavily trusted. It gave them much more confidence to coordinate and commit crimes. The vast majority of this crime was ignored for years to avoid exposing ANOM as being a honey pot.
In cooperation with many European governments, the FBI heavily encouraged and facilitated organized crime in Europe. US and European governments facilitated drug trafficking, human trafficking, murders, rape, kidnapping and much more for years while claiming it was GrapheneOS.
It’s an outrageous infringement on the GrapheneOS copyright and trademarks. US and European governments did massive harm to the GrapheneOS project through doing this. They placed us in very real danger of violence from organized crime by selling fake GrapheneOS devices to them.
GrapheneOS building technology to protect privacy and security is completely legal. Our work is strongly protected by Canadian, European and American laws. A minuscule portion of our userbase are criminals and the claims being made by the French government about that are lies.
It’s very likely a lot of the crime facilitated by ANOM wouldn’t have happened without these governments providing criminals with a communications network they believed was completely secure. The way they wrapped it up doesn’t absolve them of what they facilitated for years.
France’s government and law enforcement wants you to believe GrapheneOS and Signal are somehow responsible for crime. French law enforcement operates with impunity and has extraordinarily levels of corruption and criminal behavior. They’re the ones committing and enabling crime.
France back in 2023 targeted Signal (discovered through a leaked memo) and it’s service saying it wasn’t secure to push ministers and others to French solution Olvid.
The same year French Interior Minister Gérald Darmanin said that he would like to force encrypted messaging services to introduce ‘backdoors’ to make them available to authorities. Mirroring the recent threat from Johanna Brousse toward GrapheneOS:
“These hitherto inviolate devices, which protect communications and which do not share data on servers, are a new challenge that the cyber prosecutor’s office intends to take on”
https://www.lemonde.fr/en/pixels/article/2023/10/26/encryption-backdoors-an-unenforceable-yet-recurring-political-objective_6203950_13.html
In both cases it is likely realistically focused on pushing users to France based alternatives. In this case the EU funded murena /e/OS.
https://ngi.eu/impact-stories/e-os-project/